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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of European Central Bank’s unconventional monetary
policies between 2008-2016 on the government bond yields of eight European Monetary Union
countries and up to eleven different maturities. In identifying this impact, it adopts a novel
econometric approach that combines data-rich dynamic factor analysis and VAR with het-
eroskadasiticy based identification. This novel approach allows a single model to estimate the
impact of a common unconventional monetary policy shock across different countries, maturi-
ties, yield components and over time. The results identify a significant and substantial impact
for all countries and all maturities in the sample. The evidence also suggests that the impact
was stronger and persistent in the periphery countries which have higher financial distress, un-
certainty, country risk and lower liquidity. When we decompose the impact into separate yield
components, we find that unconventional shocks decreased the common market component of
the yields in all countries. As for the risk component, unconventional policies decreased it for
the periphery countries permanently at the cost of a small increase in the core countries, as
consistent with the international portfolio balance channel. These findings contribute to the
literature by providing a comprehensive characterization of the impact of unconventional mon-
etary policies for different economic environments.
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1 Introduction
Unconventional policies introduced during the Great Recession have redefined the toolbox of mon-
etary policy, and played a major role in the recovery that followed. Despite their importance,
however, we are still far from a complete understanding of their impact. One challenge in this
endeavour is their short history, and the limitations it imposes on the available data. A second
issue is that the standard tools that macroeconomists have developed to identify the impact of
conventional monetary policies are not well suited for unconventional ones. Consequently, most
existing studies provide a partial picture of their impacts, focusing on individual countries, specific
channels, or specific time frames1.
This study contributes to the literature by offering a comprehensive account of the impact
of European Central Bank’s (ECB) unconventional monetary policies on the government bond
yields between January 2008 and November 2016 and a discussion of cross-country differences in
responses. In particular, we estimate the impact of the ECB’s unconventional monetary shocks for
eight different countries and up to eleven different maturities using high frequency data. For each
country and maturity, the model also allows decomposing the total effect of the unconventional
policy shocks into separate effects on the common market, risk and term structure components
of the bond yields and tracking the persistence of these effects over time. This comprehensive
treatment is made feasible by a novel econometric model that combines a dynamic factor model,
heteroskedasticity based identification, and a VAR model. The estimation results provide strong
support for the effectiveness of the unconventional policies. In particular, for the common market
component of the bond yields, we find unconventional policies reduced them for all countries and
all maturities. As for the risk component, unconventional policies reduced them significantly for
peripheral economies, while increasing them slightly for the core countries. This result implies that
the sovereign risk in the periphery economies is shared by the core economies through ECB’s asset
purchases.
The unconventional monetary policies investigated in this study are expansion of central banks’
balance sheets through quantitative easing (QE), extensive liquidity provision, and forward guid-
ance2. These policies were introduced when short-term nominal interest rates in developed economies
hit the zero lower bound in the early phases of the Great Recession, leaving little room for conven-
tional monetary policy. Finding themselves in an unchartered territory, central banks in developed
countries experimented with the new monetary policy instruments, with little past experience to
rely on.
We investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies based on the experience of EMU
1For example Fratzscher et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2012) and IMF (2013) discuss that the size of the effects
depends on the specific characteristics of the UMP programme implemented.
2See Haldane et al. (2016), Joyce et al. (2012), Cecioni et al. (2011).
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countries. This choice is motivated by the unique structure of the EMU, where the decisions of
a single central bank affects bond yields across different countries and maturities. We adopt a
novel econometric approach that captures this structure, and exploits the variation it offers. The
event days in the sample are ECB’s policy announcement days between 3 January 2008 and 25
November 2016. The model estimate the impact of unconventional shocks on these days on 80
different government bond yield series, spanning Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal and Spain and maturities ranging between 1 to 30 years.
The econometric model works in three steps. In the first step, relying on a dynamic factor
model, we estimate three common factors for the 80 bond yield series for the different countries
and maturities. These three common factors respectively capture the common market, risk and the
term structure components of the bond yields in the euro area3. Reducing the 80 yield series into
three common factors allows estimating a single model for the EMU while preserving the variation
across countries and maturities.
In the second step, we estimate the impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks on each
of the common market, risk and term structure factors. In these estimations, we rely on a VAR
model with heteroskedasticity based identification which relies on the assumption that volatility
of the policy shocks are relatively higher on the announcement days 4. Heteroskedasticity based
identification allows addressing the measurement issue5 and time window selection problem 6 for
unconventional policy shocks. The VAR model, in turn, allows estimating the impulse response
functions, and hence measuring the persistence of the shock rather than the instantenous effect.
One concern with the estimation is that on some of the event days there were both unconventional
and conventional monetary policy shocks. Since we are interested in identifying the impact of un-
conventional monetary policy shocks, we include controls for the conventional policy shocks7.
Finally, in the third stage, for each country and each maturity, we back out the responses of
common market, risk and term structure components of the bond yields to unconventional mone-
tary policy shocks. To do so, we multiply the impulse responses of each of the three components
3These factors are not same with the canonical affine term structure studies in the finance literature named first
three factors level,slope and curvature.
4See Rigobon and Sack (2003) and Wright (2012) for a detailed account of heteroskedasticity based identification
5For unconventional shocks, it is difficult to measure the market expectation before the policy announcement, and
calculate the unexpected shock component. Consequently, event study method, which is commonly used to identify
news and monetary policy shocks at high-frequency in the literature, does not address this problem for unconventional
monetary policy shocks. Whereas heteroskedasticity based identification sidesteps this problem, because identification
comes from the increase in volatility on the policy announcement days.
6Because unconventional policies are difficult to interpret and analyze, it takes time for the market to price them.
Event study method requires selecting a time window for the pricing. A narrow time window may fail capture the
full effect of the policy, while a wide window may contaminate its effect with other shocks, (Martin and Milas (2012)
and Gagnon et al. (2011)). In heteroskedasticity based identification, on the other hand, the window is identified by
the model, based on the changes in volatility.
7For conventional monetary policy shocks, we rely on the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event Study Database
developed by Altavilla et al. (2019).
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obtained in the second step with the factor loadings obtained in the first step. Consequently, we
are able to drive a complete characterization of the impact of common unconventional monetary
policy shocks across countries, maturities, yield components and over time.
The results provide strong support for the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy. We
find that unconventional policy shocks decrease bond yields for all countries and all maturities. In
other words, the unconventional policies were successful in easing financial distress across the board.
With respect to cross-country variation, we find that the impact is stronger and more persistent
in the periphery countries than that in the core countries. When we correlate the impact with
country specific variables, we find that the impact is greater for higher levels of financial stress,
uncertainty, country risk, financial depth and access and lower levels of liqudity. These patterns
suggest that the policies were more effective where they were needed the most, and where financial
markets were deep enough to let them work.
When we decompose the overall impact of unconventional policies into their impacts on the com-
mon market, risk and term structure components, we find that the impact mainly works through
the first two. For the common market component, we find that the unconventional policies decrease
the yields for all countries, with stronger effects on core countries. As for the risk component, the
yields decrease significantly in the periphery countries and increase slightly in the core countries.
This significant decrease in the yields of periphery countries which have relatively higher risk pre-
mia is consistent with the impact of the portfolio balance channel of monetary transmission.
The contribution of the paper to the literature builds on the novel econometric approach. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to employ dynamic factor analysis, heteroscedas-
ticity based identification and VAR methodologies in the same model to investigate the impact of
unconventional policies. In the existing literature, one vein investigates the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policies through the event study method. In this vein, Glick and Leduc (2012),
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011) investigate the impact of these
policies for the US and Falagiarda and Reitz (2015), Eser and Schwaab (2016), Fratzscher et al.
(2016) and Chadha and Hantzsche (2018) for the euro area. While our findings on the effective-
ness of the policies are consistent with these studies, the heteroscedasticity based identification we
adopt avoids some of the pitfalls associated with measuring unconventional policy shocks. Wright
(2012) and Rogers et al. (2014), on the other hand, employs heteroscedasticity based identification
with VAR, but estimate separate models for each country and use the data for only some of the
maturities. In our analysis, the dynamic factor model in the first step allows decomposing bond
yields into three components that capture common market movements, risk and term structure
in the euro area and estimating the impact for all countries and all maturities in a single model
without heavy parameterisation. It also decreases the model uncertainty caused by omitted vari-
ables, unobservable factors and lagged endogeneity and therefore provides a reliable forecast for
3
the persistence of the monetary policy impact. Consequently, we are able to exploit the unique
structure of the EMU and engage in cross country comparisons within Europe.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the ECB’s uncon-
ventional monetary policy programme. Section 3 introduces the econometric model and section 4
the data set. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 explores the policy implications
and concludes.
2 ECB’s unconventional monetary policy and its transmission mech-
anism
2.1 Euro area monetary policy programme during global financial crisis
During the global financial crisis first FED and BOE and later ECB decreased the short-term
nominal interest rates to zero. The persistence of the recession despite the low level of short-term
interest rates raised questions about the conventional wisdom regarding monetary policy. Financial
markets became distressed and the long-term interest rates increased in the US, UK and Europe.
30-year government bond return in the US increased by 200 basis points from December 2008 to De-
cember 2009. In the EA, 10-year government bond returns for Italy, Portugal and Spain increased,
respectively, by around 300, 900 and 200 basis points from 2010 to 2012. In the same period,
uncertainty in financial markets also increased significantly. In response, FED and BOE initially
relied on direct quantitative easing8 to alleviate financial market stress and stimulate the economic
activity. ECB differed from FED and BOE because it initially implemented indirect quantitative
and credit easing and started direct quantitative easing in 2015.
The ECB sharply decreased the policy interest rate in the early 2009 and then gradually brought
it down to zero. Simultaneously, ECB adopted unconventional policy measures such as extensive
liquidity provision to the banking system, asset purchase programs, negative deposit facility rate
and forward guidance.
-Figure 1 around here-
To increase liquidity provision to the banking system and loanable funds available to investors
ECB took six unconventional policy measures (see Figure 1). It provided unlimited credit to banks
at a fixed interest rate which is referred to as fixed rate full allotment (FRFA) in late 2008, ex-
panded the range of eligible assets that could be used as collateral in refinancing operations (COLL),
conducted longer term refinancing operations to support bank lending (LTRO) in 2009, targeted
longer term refinancing operations to provide financing to credit institutions for periods of up to
8First, FED implemented QE in 2008, then BOE in 2009 and finally ECB in 2015.
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four years (TLTRO) in 2014, conducted swap lines with other central banks to increase liquidity
provision in foreign currencies (FOR), conducted covered bond purchase programs which supports
the functioning of the covered bond market and is important for bank financing (CBPP) between
2009-2014. These tools also signalled ECB’s commitment to future low interest rates.
To mitigate the risk in the euro area, ECB introduced Securities Market Programme (SMP) in
May 2010. This program aimed to reduce the sovereign bond spreads in the financially stressed
EMU countries by purchasing their government bonds. ECB terminated SMP and adopted out-
right monetary transactions (OMT) in September 2012. This new program also aimed to reduce
sovereign spreads in the risky EMU countries by purchasing their government bonds maturing in
1 to 3 years. These measures contributed to the size of ECB’s balance sheet only moderately since
they were sterilized and their volumes were relatively small.
The ECB announced an expanded asset purchase programme (APP) in January 2015 to stimu-
late economic activity and increase the inflation rate back towards its target. Under this programme,
the ECB purchased bonds issued by the governments of EMU countries, European institutions and
non-financial corporations. The size of the balance sheet of the ECB significantly increased with
the adoption of the expanded APP.
ECB decreased the deposit facility rate to zero in November 2012 and made it negative in
November 2014. Negative deposit facility rate means that the banks that deposit money in certain
accounts at the ECB have to pay for it. The aim of this policy rate cut was to ensure price stability
over the medium term and stimulate economic recovery by reducing the borrowing costs for the
investors and consumers.
Using forward guidance policies the ECB provided information about the Governing Council’s
intentions about the expected future path of the key interest rates and the horizon of its asset
purchase programme. It began using forward guidance in July 2013 when the ECB announced
that the interest rates would remain low for an extended period of time. Forward guidance policies
aimed to reduce the distress in the financial markets by reducing the uncertainty about the future
stance of the monetary policy.
All unconventional policy actions described above might have affected the economy through
signaling, liquidity premium and credit channels. In addition to these channels, SMP and OMP
programmes aimed to affect the economy through portfolio balance and risk channels. In partic-
ular, purchasing particular securities of the riskier countries decreases their returns which causes
investors to shift towards riskier assets. This shift, in turn, increases the asset prices and decreases
the interest rates in the EA.
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2.2 Transmission mechanism of UMP
Unconventional policies implemented during the global financial crisis changed the conventional
wisdom about the monetary transmission process. Below, we review the possible channels through
which these policies might have affected financial markets and economic activity. We focus on sev-
eral transmission channels that are relevant for financial markets without claiming to be exhaustive.
Signaling channel works through the extra information provided by the central bank about the
future path of the policy rate. When central bank announces its intention to keep the short-term
interest rates at low levels in the future, it is perceived as a signal by the market, which in turn
causes a decline in the long-term bond returns. This channel is related to the uncertainty channel.
Announcements of asset purchases which signal that interest rates will remain at the lower bound
for a long period of time reduce the uncertainty about the future path of the policy rates. The
effectiveness of the channel depends on the communications about the operations and their credi-
bility .
Portfolio balance channel works through the imperfect substitutability between assets of dif-
ferent maturities, asset classes and countries. When the central bank purchases specific financial
assets, it changes their availablity to the investors. This change, in turn, affects their yields. In-
vestors rebalance their portfolios towards assets that offer a better risk-return trade-off, which in
turn decreases the yields of those assets as well9.
Liquidity channel is relevant when liquidity is limited and financial markets become dysfunc-
tional. When central bank purchases long-term securities and increases bank reserves, liquidity
increases and markets function better. In turn, asset prices increase and liquidity premium that
had increased falls (Joyce et al. (2011)).
Confidence channel works when financial and economic outlook is subject to uncertainty. Mar-
ket participants are affected by high volatility in the financial markets which induces them to scale
their investments back. QE reduces macroeconomic uncertainty and increases confidence in the
financial markets by reducing the risk of an economic downturn. This decrease in uncertainty, in
turn, increases real economic activity.
Bank lending channel or credit channel works through the impact of policy decisions on the sup-
ply of credit. This impact is driven by financial incompleteness and the imperfect substitutability of
9In the standard asset-pricing framework, reallocation of assets between the central bank and the investors is
neutral and does not affect the bond prices Woodford (2012). In a world with frictionless financial markets, term
premia and prices are determined by the risk characteristics of the bonds and the risk aversion of the investors, which
do not depend on the amount of bonds. Portfolio policies may have an effect in the presence of economic frictions such
as preferred-habitat demand of investors, limits to arbitrage of different maturities, liquidity and collateral services
(see Hamilton and Wu (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2011),Vayanos and Vila (2009))
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the bank loans (Kashyap and Stein (2000),Gräb and Żochowski (2017) and Buch et al. (2018)). In
particular, businesses and consumers that rely on bank loans cannot easily replace them with other
types of financing. Hence, a reduction in the credit supply causes a decline in consumption and
investment. An expansionary unconventional monetary policy increases bank reserves and results
in an increase in the loan supply. The size of the impact depends on the characteristics of the banks
such as capitalization, asset size, and liquidity. Banks with high capital and liquidity ratios benefit
more from the QE.
The impacts of the transmission channels discussed above overlap which makes it difficult to
separate one from the other. The effectiveness of these channels depend on the specifics of the
policies, the design of asset purchase programs, and the structure of the economy and financial
system (see Haldane et al. (2016)). In this study, we investigate the impact of unconventional
policies, the variation in impact across countries, and how this variation relates to the frictions in
the financial system.
3 Model and identification scheme
In this section, we discuss the methodology for obtaining the impulse response functions of the EA
sovereign bond yields to the unconventional policy shocks by the ECB. For this purpuse, we rely
on a dynamic factor model together with heteroscedasticity based identification. Heteroscedastic-
ity based idetification was introduced by Wright (2012) to identify the impact of monetary policy
shocks. To do so, two separate VAR models are estimated for the policy announcement days and
non-policy days. This framework, however, is only suitable for low dimensional VAR models since
the number of announcement days is limited.
In this study, we evaluate the impact of unconventioal monetary shocks on 80 sovereign gov-
ernment bond yields for eight EMU countries. The large number of yield series make it infeasible
to rely on heteroscedasticity based identification, due to the degrees of freedom issue discussed
above. To overcome this problem, we adopt a three-stage procedure. In the first stage, we apply
a dynamic factor model for dimension reduction and obtain a smaller set of dynamic factors. The
second stage employs heteroscedasticity based identification on these factors to derive the impulse
response functions (IRF). In the last stage, we back out the IRFs for the observed series from the
IRFs of the dynamic factors.
3.1 Dynamic factor model
Let N vector Yt stack all sovereign government bond yields, and N1 vector X1,t include other
exogenous covariates at time period t = 1, 2, · · · , T , respectively. Each variable in Yt can be defined
as Yi,t for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Consequently, the model that relates the observable variables Yt, X1,t
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and the latent factors Ft can be illustrated as follows:
Yi,t = β
′X1,t + λ
′
iFt + ei,t ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , N (1)
Φ(L)Ft = εt (2)
where λi is a 1 × r vector of the factor loadings for each variable i = 1, 2, · · · , N , β1 is the vector
of the coefficients of the covariates X1,t, Ft is a r vector of static factors and ei,t is the residuals for
all i = 1, 2, · · · , N in the factor model. Additionally, we assume a VAR structure for the factors Ft
where Φ(L) is the lag polynomial that governs the VAR model and εt is a r vector of innovations.
Note that we impose r < N to achieve dimension reduction. We try to elaborate the selection of r
in the results section. This factor model can be written in matrix notation as the following:
Y = Xβ + FΛ′ + e (3)
where Y and e be T × N matrices of observations and residuals, respectively. F is T × r matrix
of the static factors, Λ is r × N matrix that concatenates the factor loadings and X1 is T × N1
matrix of exogenous covariates. Note that we can also write this model in the difference form:
∆Y = ∆X1β + ∆Fλ
′ + ∆e. This notation is particularly important since we utilize the principal
component (PC) method to extract the factors. In order to employ the PC technique, the observ-
able variables should be stationary Bai and Ng (2013). However, we can recover Ft by integrating
the estimated factors from the differenced model10.
Before employing PC on the observed bond yields, we need to remove the covariates from
Y . These covariates contain the implied stock market volatility index(VIX) that captures the
global financial turmoil and economic risk and 10-years rate on U.S. government bonds.Having
these indicators is crucially important to disentangle exogenous innovations to ECB’s policy from
the yield responses to global uncertainty and Fed’s actions which have large influence on global
financial conditions. Consider the model ∆Y = ∆X1β + ut where ut = ∆Fλ
′ + ∆e. We first
obtain the residuals from this regression, say ût = ∆Yt − ∆X1,tβ̂ where β̂ is the vector of the
OLS estimates. As a result, we can use ût instead of ∆Yt to obtain the factors, since ût does
not contain any information shared with the covariate vector X1,t1 asymptotically. We denote the
estimated r principle components from ût as ∆F̂t. Integrating these principle components, we get
the r estimated factors, namely F̂t.
3.2 Heteroscedasticy based identification
Utilizing the estimated factors, we use heteroscedasticity based identification that exploits the
volatility difference between the announcement and non-announcement days. This section follows
Wright’s (2012), which introduced the method.
10The details of the PC method can be found in Stock and Watson (2002).
8
Let F̂t be the estimated r factors estimated as described in the previous section. Further, we
assume that the dynamic structure of F̂t is governed by equation (2):
Φ(L)F̂t = εt for all t = 1, ..., T (4)
The standard identification procedure in VAR models relies on the factorization of the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form error terms. In other words, the identification is constructed
on the second moment of the error terms. In contrast, heteroscedasticity based identification builds
the identification procedure on the level of the reduced form innovations. The basic structure is
given as follows:
εt =
k∑
i=1
Riηi,t (5)
where ηi,ts are k independent shocks and r × 1 vector Ri is constant weight of each shock. In
this setup, each shock may correspond to an economic or financial element that affects the fac-
tor structure with different weights. For instance, we assume that the first shock, η1,t, to be the
monetary policy shock. R1 quantifies the impact of this shock. The ordering of the shocks does
not matter since the shocks are not directly associated with the variables in F̂t. Rather, they are
associated with other economic or financial elements. Moreover, we assume that η1,t has zero mean
with a variance of σ2η1,1 on announcement and σ
2
η1,0
on non-announcement days. For the other
structural shocks j = 2, ..., k, we assume σ2ηj ,1 = σ
2
ηj ,0
. In words, the policy announcements only
influence the volatility of monetary policy shock while the variances of other shocks remain constant.
This setup requires two separate VAR models for the announcement and non-announcement
days. For this purpose, we define an announcement day dummy polt, where polt = 1 if t is
an announcement day and polt = 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we denote two mutually exclusive
information set as D0 = {t ∈ N : polt = 0} and D1 = {t ∈ N : polt = 1} for non-announcement and
announcement days, respectively. Using these information sets, the two VAR models are:
Model 0: Φ(0)(L)F̂t = εt for all t ∈ D0 (6)
Model 1: Φ(1)(L)F̂t + β2X2,t = εt for all t ∈ D1 (7)
where we assume that the same lag truncation for Φ(0)(L) and Φ(1)(L). X2,t is the vector of
the policy surprise series that are used for concentrating out the impacts of the exogenous con-
ventional policy shocks11. Let Σ1 be the r × r dimensional variance-covariance matrix of εt on
the announcement days and Σ0 be the r × r dimensional variance-covariance matrix on the non-
11Because the monetary policy meeting days in our sample also include conventional monetary policy decision, we
control for their impact by including exogenous measures of conventional policy surprises in the model. We estimated
our model without conventional monetary policy decisions and we found no significant changes in our results.
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announcement days. The difference of the variance-covariance matrices on the announcement and
non-announcement days can be represented as:
Σ1 − Σ0 = (σ2η1,1 − σ
2
η1,2)R1R
′
1
where we normalize σ2η1,1 − σ
2
η1,2
to 1, since R1R
′
1 and σ
2
η1,1
− σ2η1,2 cannot be separately identified.
In order to estimate the vector R1, we will use the following optimization problem proposed by
Wright (2012):
R̂1 = argmin
R1
[
vech(Σ̂1 − Σ̂0)− vech(R1R′1)
]′
[V̂0 + V̂1]
−1
[
vech(Σ̂1 − Σ̂0)− vech(R1R′1)
]
(8)
Σ̂1 is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of reduced form error terms in Model 1, Σ̂0 is
estimated variance-covariance matrix of reduced form VAR residuals in Model 0, V̂1 is variance-
covariance matrix of Σ̂1 and V̂0 is variance-covariance matrix of Σ̂0. After we obtain an estimate
for R1, we can use it to compute the impulse response of each factor to the monetary policy shock.
3.3 The impulse response functions
In this subsection, we describe how we obtain the impulse response functions (IRF) for the observ-
able variables. For this purpose, we first generate IRFs for the factor model, and then compute the
IRFs for the variables in Yt. First, suppose that the estimated full sample VAR is given as:
F̂t = Φ̂0 + Φ̂1F̂t−1 + Φ̂2F̂t−2 + ...+ Φ̂pF̂t−n + ε̂t
where p is lag length which is selected by Bayesian information criterion. We can write this
estimated model in terms of Vector Moving Average representation:
F̂t = ε̂t + Θ̂1ε̂t−1 + Θ̂2ε̂t−2...
with Θ̂i =
∑i
j=1 Θ̂i−jΦ̂j for all i = 1, 2, .... The h period ahead impulse response of the ith variable
to monetary policy shock can be computed as following:
∂F̂i,t+h
∂η1,t
= IRFh,i for i = 1, 2, · · · , r
where IRFh,i is the impulse response of the i
th factor to the one standard deviation monetary
policy shock and IRFh = Θ̂h × R̂1. However, the goal is to derive the impulse response functions
for the observed series in Yt. We can reconstruct these impulse responses by simply multiplying
IRFh with Λ, that is ĨRF h = Λ
′IRFh. Note that IRFh is a r×1 vector and ˜IRF h is a N×1 vector.
The next step is constructing the confidence intervals for the impulse responses. To derive the
intervals, we use stationary block bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994) combined with the Kilian
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(1998) bias adjustment. The bootstrapping procedure is described in the A.
Notice that our identification scheme relies on the difference between the variance of the reduced
form residuals from announcement and non-announcement days. In order to check this condition,
we apply Box’s m test Box (1949). This test is based on the hypothesis that two (or more) variance-
covariance matrices are equal to each other, that is H0 : Σ0 = Σ1 vs H0 : Σ0 6= Σ1. The associated
test statistic can be constructed with the following likelihood function:
logL = (T − 2)log(|S|)−
1∑
i=0
(Ti − k)log(|Σ̂i|)
where, S =
∑1
i=0(Ti−k)Σ̂i
T−2k is pooled variance and Ti is the sample size of each model and k is number
of parameters estimated in each model12. Then, we can use the test statistic below:
BM = (1− h)logL ∼ χ2
(
r(r + 1)
2
)
and
h =
2r2 + 3r − 1
6(r + 1)
[
1∑
i=0
(
1
Ti − k
)
− 1
T − 2k
]
We rely on bootstrap inference for this test, since the number of announcement dates is small. We
describe the bootstrap routine for this test in the A.
In this test, the null hypothesis of variance equality is rejected if BM > χ2
(
r(r+1)
2
)
or
BM > CVα(BM
∗) where CV1−α(BM
∗) is the (1 − α) − th quantile of the bootstrap empirical
distribution.
4 Data and summary statistics
Our data sample is a daily balanced panel which consists of 80 time series and runs from 3 January
2008 to 25 November 201613. It covers from one to thirty year maturity fixed-zero-coupon bond
yields for 8 EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain14. Bond yield data is taken from Thomson Reuters Database. We also include EA aggregate
5-year and 10-year bond yields data from ECB as average yields for the Euro Area.We use the
implied stock market volatility index VIX index from CBOE to control for market fear and global
risk aversion and 10-years rate on U.S. government bonds as exogenous control variables.
12We assume equal k for model 1 and 0. If they are unequal (if different lag truncation is used), then the procedure
should be adjusted accordingly.
13The weekends and holidays are removed from the sample.
14Our sample starts from 2008, since it is possible to construct a balanced dataset after this date. Greece and
Ireland are dropped from the sample due to the lack of data
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We cover all monetary policy announcements by the ECB since Jan 2008 including speeches,
press conferences, and press releases15. On announcements days, conventional policies, unconven-
tional policies or a mix of the two could be announced. To control for the impact of conventional
policy announcements, we include 1 month OIS rate change in the VAR analysis, relying on the
data from the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event Study Database 16.
-Figure 2 around here-
Figure 2 shows the movements in 10-year sovereign bond yields. Except for the sovereign
debt-crisis period, yields are highly correlated and move together. This pattern suggests a strong
common market factor, arguably driven by the common exchange rate and the single monetary
policy. After mid-2010, Italy, Portugal and Spain diverged from the core countries as a result of
the increase in the risk and term premia (Ángel Garćıa and Gimeno (2014)). The yields for these
countries began to decrease following ECB’s announcement of the OMT programme17 and con-
verged to the core economies in 2014 with the PSPP announcements. The trajectory of the yields
suggests that ECB intervention successfully led to a decline in the risk premium in the distressed
sovereign markets.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the first differences of the 10-year bond yields for each
country on the policy and non-policy days. Unconditional mean and volatility of daily changes in
yields on policy dates are higher than those on non-policy dates. As expected, the largest fall in the
yields is observed on the unconventional policy announcement days.18 In contrast, the changes in
the core countries’ yields are insignificant on unconventional policy announcement days, suggesting
a heterogenous impact across EMU countries.
- Table 1 around here-
5 Empirical results
In this section, we first present the estimated factors and their loadings and interpret them eco-
nomically. Second, we present the evidence on the contribution of each factor to the overall impact
of the monetary policy shocks. Third, we present the results for the impact on maturities and the
term structure of the interest rates. Finally, we show the cross-correlations between country level
responses and observed country-specific characteristics and discuss the relevant monetary policy
15The ECB’s policy announcement days are listed in Table B.1 in B.
16Altavilla et al. (2019). We use the rate change in the press release window, since it provides information only
about the policy decision itself and not the related discussion.
17ECB President Mario Draghi made the “Whatever it takes.” speech on 26 July 2012 followed by the official
announcement of the OMT Programme in early August 2012.
18Portuguese yields fell by 204 basis points in May 2010 with the SMP announcement and Italian and Spanish
yields fell by 81 and 90 basis points respectively in August 2011 with the SMP extension for Italy and Spain.
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transmission channels.
5.1 Interpretation of the estimated factors
We estimate that the three common factors explain about 70% of the variation in the yields. Fig-
ure 3 plots R2 ordered by countries and maturities.
-Figure 3 around here-
The relative importance of the three factors varies across countries and maturities. They ex-
plain over 80% of the variation in the longer maturities and between 10-50% of the variation in
the shorter maturities. Interestingly, the idiosyncratic component explains the highest share of the
variation on the short-end of the yield curve, and the common market factor explains only about
25% of the variation.
Following McCracken and Ng (2016) we also calculate marginal R2s to see the corresponding
series that load most heavily on each factor. The results are presented in Table 2.
-Table 2 around here
-Figure 4 around here-
The first factor is associated with the core countries’ medium and long-term yields with marginal
R2s close to 0.80. Figure 5a shows the close overlap between factor 1 and 10-year bond returns in
the core countries and suggests that factor 1 can be interpreted as the common market factor. The
loading approach, which estimates the sensitivity of the bond returns to each factor, also suggests
the same interpretation. The estimated loadings for factor 1, presented in Figure 4, are similar
across core countries for maturities greater than a year19.
-Figure 5 around here-
The second factor captures the differences between the core and distressed countries with
marginal R2s close to 0.55. Figure 5b provides evidence for this interpretation, by plotting the
second factor together with the risk premiums of the 5-year bond returns in the periphery coun-
tries relative to the German bonds. Between 2010 and 2014, the long term government bond returns
in Italy, Spain and Portugal diverged from the returns in Germany due to the concerns about the
sustainability of government debt. The second factor, which is close to zero except for this period,
also increases after 2010, peaks in 2012 and decreases until 2014. This close overlap suggests that
the second factor can be interpreted as the risk premium in the EMU countries and henceforth will
19Except for some of the 1-year bond yields, changes caused by the first factor are almost constant for all maturities,
with some differences between core and distressed countries.
13
be referred to as the risk structure factor.
The third factor captures the term structure with marginal R2 of 0.18. Figure 5c plots the third
factor together with the difference between 30-year and 2-year government bond returns in the pe-
riphery countries. The spread between the short-term and the long-term bond returns increased
after the onset of the global financial crisis, decreased after the ECB introduced unconventional
policy measures, and increased again after the sovereign debt crisis. Factor 3 follows the same
patterns, especially for Portugal until 2014. Based on this close relationship, we refer to Factor 3
as the term structure factor.
5.2 Impulse response analysis
In this section, we first verify the identification condition of the monetary policy shocks in the
model by testing whether the variance-covariance matrices of the two regimes are different from
each other. As we discussed in Section 3.3, we employ the Box’s M test to verify this condition.
We find that the Box’s M statistic (BM statistic) is 2604.5 with a bootstrap critical value of 787.7
and bootstrap p value of 0. Hence, there is strong evidence that the variance-covariance matrices
are different for policy and non-policy days.
We next investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policy shocks on the EA 5 and 10-
year bond yields to normalize the monetary policy shock. Figure 6 plots the estimated responses
of the bond yields to an expansionary monetary policy shock with a 95% bootstrap confidence
interval. The identified monetary policy shock is normalized to lower EA 5-year yields by 50 basis
points20. The shock also lowers the EA 10-year bond yields, but the magnitude of the impact is
slightly smaller. The half-life of the estimated impulse responses for EA yields are about 2 months.
Below, we first discuss the impact of this normalized policy shock on the estimated factors.
Second, we show the impact on the market component, risk structure and term structure of the
yields. Third, we investigate the composite effect of the normalized policy shock on bond returns
and the persistence of the responses for maturities from 1 to 30 years. Finally, we show that the
initial and time-lagged responses of the yield curves for each country.
-Figure 6 around here-
5.2.1 The impact on the different components of bond yields
Before we present the results for the composite impact of unconventional policy measures at the
zero lower bound, we review their impact on the common market, risk and term structure compo-
20We normalize the shock for the 5-year yield as it is at the midpoint of yield curve. ECB mainly targets bonds
with 2-10 years maturity when implementing unconventional monetary policies.
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nents of the bond yields. We then discuss the role that each individual factor played in the overall
impact of the shock.
Figure 7 shows the responses of the three factors to a normalized unconventional monetary
policy shock. The factors that capture the common market component and the risk structure of
the bond returns, factors 1 and 2, respond strongly and significantly. The response of factor 3, the
term structure factor, is also significant but weaker than the responses of first two.
-Figure 7 around here-
We obtain the impulse responses for the common market component of the bond yields by
multiplying the impulse response function of factor 1, the common market factor, with its load-
ings. Common market factor increases in response to a normalized unconventional monetary policy
shock. The loadings for factor 1 are negative for all countries and similar across maturities. As
shown in Figure 8, these findings imply that unconventional monetary policy shocks reduce all
yields and shifts the yield curve downward through its impact on the market factor in all EMU
countries21. Due to the bank based structure of the EA, unconventional policy measures included
extensive liquidity provisions to the banking system. This policy aimed to increase the credit vol-
ume22 and reduce the government bond returns by decreasing the risk of government bailouts and
influencing agents’ expectations for the future stance of the economy23. The impact on the market
component of the bond yields is consistent with the objectives of these policies.
Our findings suggest that unconventional policies were effective in decreasing the common mar-
ket component of the government bond returns. However, the absolute value of the loadings for
factor 1 are higher for the core countries, which implies that the impact of policy shocks on the
bond returns through the common market factor is stronger for the core countries. This heteroge-
neous response might be due to the structural differences in the two country groups. The impact
of liquidity provision depends on how deep and solvent the banking sector is. Consequently, coun-
tries with more developed financial systems benefit more from the extensive liquidity provision.
This pattern is consistent with Jäger and Grigoriadis (2017), which shows that the impact of long
term liquidity financing operations and lowering the deposit rate to zero percent is negative and
significant for the non-crisis EMU countries while they are insignificant for the crisis EMU countries.
-Figure 8 around here-
We obtain the impulse responses for the risk component of the bond yields by multiplying the
21Only for Portugal, the impact through the market factor is relatively higher at the long end of the yield curve,
which causes a decline in the liquidity premium and makes the yield curve flatter.
22Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) show that the main transmission channel of LTROs is the credit provision
by the banking sector.
23Gerlach et al. (2010) shows that bank related factors explain up to almost one percentage point of EA sovereign
spreads. Fratzscher and Rieth (2015) finds that there is a bidirectional relationship between the sovereign risk and
bank risk.
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impulse response function of factor 2 with its loadings. The risk factor increases in response to
a normalized unconventional monetary policy shock. The loadings for factor 2 are negative for
the periphery countries and positive for the core countries. Consequently, as shown in Figure 8b,
unconventional policy shocks decrease the risk component of the bond returns in the periphery
countries and increase them in the core countries through the risk factor. Our results also suggest
that the impact on the risk component of the bond yields is persistent for the periphery countries.
This pattern is consistent with Fratzscher and Rieth (2015), which shows that SMP decreases the
sovereign spreads for the crisis EMU countries while it increases them for the non-crisis ones. One
possible explanation for the pattern is that the risk on the ECB’s balance sheet increases because of
the purchase of risky country bonds which in turn affects the risk assessment of the core countries
negatively and increases their bond returns. In other words, the risk in the periphery economies is
shared by the core economies through ECB’s asset purchases from the periphery economies.
To investigate whether the announcement of the SMP and OMT programs reduced the risk
premium in the financially stressed countries, we also checked how the risk factor changed on the
SMP and OMT announcement days. Table 3 shows that, on average, the risk factor increased by
10 basis points on the SMP and OMT announcement days which implies that these announcements
reduced the sovereign spreads for Italy, Spain and Portugal. This finding suggests that the portfolio
balance channel was effective in the sample period. It is also consistent with Falagiarda and Reitz
(2015), Eser and Schwaab (2016), Chadha and Hantzsche (2018) and Fratzscher and Rieth (2015),
which show that SMP reduced the EA risk by decreasing the sovereign spreads in the stressed EMU
countries.
Finally, we multiply the impulse response function for factor 3 with its loadings to obtain the
impulse responses for the term structure component of the bond yields. The term structure factor,
also responds positively to unconventional policy shocks. However, the response of factor 3 is weaker
than those of the other factors. As shown in Figure 8c, the loadings for factor 3 increase with the
maturity for all countries except Portugal. Hence, uncoventional policy shocks make the yield curve
slightly steeper in these countries. Only for Portugal, the term premiums for both medium and
long term bonds decrease and the yield curve becomes flatter. Furthermore, since Portugal’s factor
loadings are negative and higher in absolute value for medium term bond returns, unconventional
policy measures make the yield curve more convex. Overall, the impact is substantial for Portugal,
and negligible for other countries.
5.2.2 The overall impact on the EMU countries
This section investigates the overall responses of the bond yields to monetary policy shocks. A non-
standard monetary policy shock which is equivalent to a 50 bps drop in EA 5-year yields induces
significant drops in yields for all maturities and countries. Expectedly, accommodative monetary
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shocks are priced rapidly in the bond market.
-Figure 9 around here-
Figure 9 shows the aggregate responses of selected bond yields to ECB’s unconventional mon-
etary policy announcements for 8 EMU countries24. The figure suggests that the identified policy
announcements at the ZLB have been effective in easing financial conditions in both core and
periphery EMU countries. The impact is substantial and persistent for the periphery while it is
weaker and temporary for the core countries.
The results show that short-term, medium-term and long-term bond returns for Spain, Italy
and Portugal decrease by around 150-200 basis points in response to a normalized unconventional
monetary policy shock. Responses of the bond returns are persistent for all maturities. This pat-
tern suggests that unconventional policy measures shift the yield curve downward permanently in
the periphery countries.
The results for Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium differ from those for the
periphery countries. The previous section provided evidence that the policy shocks affect the bond
returns in these countries negatively through the common market factor and positively through the
risk factor. The cumulative responses show that the impact through the common market factor is
stronger and the overall impact is negative. A normalized unconventional monetary policy shock
reduces the bond returns by around 50 basis points in Germany, 90 basis points in France, Austria
and Netherlands and 120 basis points in Belgium. The responses are weaker and transitory in these
countries compared to those in the periphery countries. Consequently, the yield curve initially shifts
downward and but later returns close to the initial level in 11 months for Belgium and 6 months
for the other countries.
The results provide evidence that periphery countries benefited from the non-standard policies
by the ECB more than the core countries did. The heterogeneity in the responses of the periphery
and the core countries can be explained by the shifts in the sovereign risk as captured by factor
2. The sovereign bond spreads in Italy, Spain and Portugal increased relative to Germany due to
the deterioration in the fiscal positions and macroeconomic fundamentals and concerns about the
sustainability of government debt25. We find that unconventional policy measures and especially
SMP and OMP announcements were effective in addressing these concerns and led to the conver-
gence of the bond returns in the EA26.
We find that the impact of unconventional monetary policies is persistent, lasting longer than a
year for the European periphery. This finding contrasts with the earlier studies which finds that the
24The impulse responses for individual maturities are reported in Appendix B.
25Gerlach et al. (2010), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2013), De Santis (2012) and Giordano
et al. (2013).
26The next section discusses the cross-country variation in more detail.
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impact dies within six months for the US, UK and EA (Wright (2012) and Rogers et al. (2014) ).
Neely et al. (2014) argues that this transitory impact result in the earlier studies was driven by the
instability of the structural VAR models caused by model mis-specification. Arguably, what allows
our model to sidestep this problem and identify the persistent impact is the dimension reduction
in the first step, which decreases the model uncertainty caused by omitted variables, unobservable
factors and lagged endogeneity. Hence, when we test structural stability by using Bai and Perron’s
(2003) test based on the global information criterion, the procedure27 finds no breaks both in
announcement and non-announcement day VARs of the factor model, and suggests that the model
is stable and provides reliable forecasts for the overall impact and the persistence.
5.2.3 The overall impact on the term structure of interest rates
This section investigates the responses of the term-structure of the interest rates to the unconven-
tional monetary policy shocks. The initial responses of the bond yields to expansionary announce-
ments increase as the maturity increases approximately until 6-7 years, and then starts to decrease
at the long-end of the yield curve. This pattern is in line with the aim of the unconventional policy
measures. ECB, like other major central banks, mostly targets longer-term interest rates directly
with UMP announcements. The evidence shows that the impact on the yields is the largest for
mid-maturity bond returns: 2-3 years for Germany and Netherlands, 6-7 years for the other coun-
tries. Responses of these mid-maturity yields are more persistent than those of the shorter and
longer maturities. These findings are consistent with the recent literature which studies the impact
of UMP announcements on the bond yields. Bernhard and Ebner (2017) finds that the impact of
expansionary shocks is larger for Swiss long-term government yields, in particular for bonds with
maturities of 7 to 10 years. Rogers et al. (2014) finds that the impact of monetary policy shocks
at the ZLB is larger at the long end of the yield curve for the US, UK and Japan. In contrast,
Altavilla et al. (2016) and Eser and Schwaab (2016) show that SMP and OMT announcements
cause a higher drop at the short end of the yield curve. However, these studies cover the period
in which OMP and SMP programmes were announced and implemented. In this study, we are
interested in the overall impact of policy announcements regardless of the specific programmes.
-Figure 10 around here-
Figure 10 shows the responses of the yield curves to a normalized monetary policy shock for
each country. The solid black lines are the yield curves of the countries drawn using average bond
yields over the period 2008-2016 for maturities up to 10 years. The dashed lines are estimated
initial responses of the yields and responses after one week, one month, three months, six months
and one year from the policy shock. The figure clearly shows that accommodative policy shocks
diminish all yields considerably on the announcement day and shifts the yield curve downward for
27In this procedure, we utilize Schwarz information criterion and a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected
standard errors. Considering the sample size of the announcement day VAR, we utilize 10% trimming for arranging
the search region for structural breaks. Furthermore, we allow all coefficients of each equation in a VAR change
simultaneously. This allows us to analyze equation by equation stability of the system.
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all countries. However, the impact is more persistent for the periphery countries, where it takes
more than a year for the yields to return to the initial levels, compared to 6 months for the core
economies. The monetary policy shock also decreases the curvature of yield curves in Portugal,
Italy, Austria and France, whose mid-maturity yields react strongly.
5.3 Cross-country variation in responses
The preceding discussion provided evidence that the impact of the unconventional monetary policy
shock on the bond yields is heterogeneous across the EMU countries. In this section, we investigate
the relationship between the heterogeneity in the responses and country-specific characteristics and
discuss the roles that different transmission channels might have played in this variation. We rely
on simple correlations between the peak responses and observed country characteristics, and hence
the results should be interpreted with caution28.
Figure 11 plots the peak responses of 10-years yields against average proxies for country-specific
characteristics and calculates simple cross-correlations. The dashed black line is the best-fit line
for the relationship.
-Figure 11 around here-
Several patterns emerge from the figure. For one, it shows a negative relationship between peak
responses of the yields and country-level index of financial stress. In other words, financial markets
under stress benefit more from the expansionary announcements. This pattern is consistent with
the argument that unconventional policy announcements reduced the uncertainty in the financial
system and affected the economy through the uncertainty channel.
The figure also shows that higher peak responses are associated with low liquidity and dys-
functional financial markets. We use banks’ liquid assets to deposits ratio to measure liquidity,
and banks’ non-performing loans to gross loans ratio and z-score to measure the dysfunction in
the financial markets. This finding is consistent with the argument that unconventional policies
improved liquidity conditions and market funtioning, and affected the economy through liquidity
channel, as consistent with the evidence provided by Elbourne et al. (2018).
As for risk premium and duration risk, we find that the peak responses are higher at higher lev-
els. We use debt to GDP ratio, risk premium on the sovereign bonds and credit ratings to measure
the country risk premium and term spread to measure the duration risk. The positive relationship
between these variables and peak responses are consistent with the argument that unconventional
policy announcements reduced the sovereign and duration risks and affected the economy through
28The summary statistics and definitions for all of indicators are in Data Appendix Table B.3.
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international portfolio balance channel, as captured by the response of the risk structure factor 29.
Finally, the results show that the peak responses are higher in the countries with deeper financial
markets and higher access to finance, proxied respectively by private credit to GDP ratio and bank
branches per 100000 adults. This finding reflects the fact that the impact of liquidity provision
to the financial system depends on how deep and solvent the banking sector is. Consequently,
countries with deeper and more accessible banking sector benefited more from the extensive liquidity
provision.
6 Conclusion
During the Great Recession, central banks in developed economies were forced to bring the interest
rates down to zero, leaving no room for conventional policy. Consequently, the central banks exper-
imented with several unconventional monetary policies, with little guidance from past experience.
In the light of the recovery that followed, the common wisdom about these unconventional policies
is that they were successful. There is, however, little consensus over the magnitude of their causal
impact, and how the impact varied across countries, assets, and horizons.
This paper provides a comprehensive picture of the impact of unconventional monetary policies
on government bond yields in European Monetary Union. What allows this in-depth treatment is a
novel methodology that combines dynamic factor model, identification through heteroskedasticity
and VAR. This methodology allows exploiting the unique structure of EMU with a single central
bank and multiple economies, and estimating the impact of common unconventional policy shocks
on 80 different bond yields. It also allows us to decompose the overall impact into the impacts on
the market and risk components of the yields. Consequently, we are able to describe the impact of
unconventional policies across different countries, maturities, yield components and time horizons.
The results corroborate that unconventional policies had a strong overall effect, but with signif-
icant variation across the countries. Broadly speaking, the policies decreased the risk component of
the bond yields substantially for the periphery and increased them slightly for the core countries.
This differential impact, consistent with the portfolio balance channel, drove the convergence in
bond returns between the periphery and the core. The impact in the periphery was also more
persistent than that in the core. As for maturities, we find that the impact worked on all, with a
slightly bigger impact for mid-maturities. Finally, our results suggest that the impact was stronger
for the countries which had higher financial distress and needed ECB’s support the most and coun-
tries with developed markets where policies had room to operate.
29Chadha and Hantzsche (2018), Wieladek and Pascual (2016) and Bauer and Neely (2014) also find that portfoloio
balance channel played an important role in the transmission of QE policies.
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The heterogeneity in the impact of unconventional monetary policies we document motivates
further research into its drivers. From a theoretical perspective, the heterogeneity is of interest,
as it provides insights about the relative importance of different transmission channels discussed
in the literature under different conditions. From a policy perspective, understanding the hetero-
geneity matters, as it allows monetary authorities to design more effective interventions. While
unconventional policies were introduced somewhat haphazardly during the crisis, they are now an
important part of the monetary policy toolbox, and understanding how they interact with local
economic structures is essential for using them effectively.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Change in 10-year Sovereign Yields Summary Statistics
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Date Max Date Kurtosis Skew.
Difference on Policy Dates
Austria -0.003 0.060 -0.164 30-Nov-11 0.170 03-Jun-15 3.600 0.118
Belgium -0.014 0.071 -0.429 30-Nov-11 0.203 03-Dec-15 10.724 -1.319
France -0.007 0.060 -0.203 30-Nov-11 0.189 03-Dec-15 4.112 0.159
Germany -0.002 0.064 -0.181 19-Mar-09 0.196 03-Dec-15 3.876 0.308
Italy -0.011 0.109 -0.811 08-Aug-11 0.359 02-Aug-12 21.391 -2.188
Netherlands -0.004 0.059 -0.159 06-Nov-08 0.174 03-Dec-15 3.334 0.100
Portugal -0.030 0.239 -2.042 10-May-10 0.629 07-Jul-11 35.595 -4.231
Spain -0.011 0.129 -0.905 08-Aug-11 0.510 02-Aug-12 19.372 -1.525
Difference on Non-Policy Dates
Austria -0.002 0.051 -0.266 01-Dec-11 0.352 03-Jan-12 7.548 0.569
Belgium -0.001 0.054 -0.274 05-Dec-11 0.371 25-Nov-11 8.401 0.708
France -0.001 0.048 -0.216 24-May-12 0.247 10-Nov-11 5.085 0.213
Germany -0.002 0.050 -0.193 02-Nov-11 0.238 25-Nov-11 4.323 0.165
Italy 0.000 0.074 -0.445 11-Nov-11 0.579 09-Nov-11 10.613 0.338
Netherlands -0.002 0.047 -0.180 02-Nov-11 0.278 09-Dec-08 4.731 0.309
Portugal 0.002 0.223 -1.521 31-Jan-12 3.174 25-Nov-11 72.465 3.992
Spain 0.000 0.079 -0.540 27-Jan-12 0.600 20-Jan-12 10.972 -0.097
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Table 2: Factors Estimated: Total Variation Explained, 0.70
mR2(1) 0.451 mR2(2) 0.191 mR2(3) 0.050
gb6y Fra 0.815 gb5y Ita 0.592 gb4y Por 0.646
gb7y Fra 0.810 gb4y Ita 0.585 gb6y Por 0.615
gb8y Fra 0.794 gb8y Ita 0.584 gb5y Por 0.614
gb9y Fra 0.782 gb7y Ita 0.573 gb3y Por 0.579
gb10y Fra 0.765 gb7y Spa 0.573 gb10y Por 0.534
gb5y Fra 0.740 gb6y Ita 0.572 gb2y Por 0.442
gb7y Aus 0.737 gb6y Spa 0.567 gb30y Spa 0.038
gb10y Aus 0.712 gb5y Spa 0.565 gb30y Ita 0.028
gb6y Net 0.709 gb4y Spa 0.559 gb2y Ger 0.028
gb4y Net 0.704 gb8y Spa 0.547 gb9y Spa 0.025
gb6y Aus 0.696 gb3y Spa 0.547 gb10y Spa 0.025
gb8y Net 0.695 gb9y Ita 0.537 gb10y Ita 0.025
gb5y Net 0.689 gb9y Spa 0.535 gb3y Ger 0.022
gb9y Net 0.686 gb10y Ita 0.531 gb1y Ger 0.017
gb9y Bel 0.683 gb10y Spa 0.512 gb30y Fra 0.017
Note: This table lists the 15 series that load most heavily on the first
3 factors along with R2 in a regression of the series on the factor. For
example, factor 1 explains 0.451 variation of 80 series. First factor
explains 0.815 of the variation in 6-year French yields, 0.712 of the
variation of 7-year Australian yields.
Table 3: Changes in the Factor 2 on
SMP and OMT Days
Mean St. Dev.
Factor 2 (level)
Policy days -10.197 6.672
Non-policy days -4.799 6.752
Factor 2 (daily change)
Policy days 1.408 1.955
Non-policy days -0.003 0.427
Note: Policy days contain only SMP and
OMT announcement days.
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Figure 2: 10-year Bond Yields
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Figure 5: Factors and Related Economic Variables
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses of Bond Yields of EA
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses of the Estimated Factors
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Figure 10: The Impact of UMP on Term Structure of Yield Curve
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Figure 11: Cross-correlations Between Estimated Responses and Country-specific Proxies
35
A Bootstrap confidence interval
In order to find the bootstrapped confidence interval for the IRFs, we use the following routine:
1. First we pick the number of bootstrap replication, B, and the significance level as α.
2. We extract r factors, F̂t, from Yt and also save the factor loadings Λ. Then, we estimate
the full sample VAR using F̂t and get the reduced form residuals ε̂t and the OLS coefficients
Φ̂(L).
3. For b = 1, 2, .., B, we draw a random sample of the indices from the set {1, 2, · · · , T} according
to stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994) with 10 days of average block length.
We denote the resampled set of the indices as
{
U
∗(b)
t
}T
t=1
. The resampled residuals are
generated as ε̂
∗(b)
t = ε̂U∗(b)t
.
4. While resampling the residuals, we also resample polt. This leads to a change in the an-
nouncement date vector, say pol
∗(b)
t = polU∗(b)t
.
5. Then, we reconstruct the factors F̂t by using the resampled residuals and the VAR coefficients
Φ̂(L) from the full sample VAR:
F̂
∗(b)
t = Φ̂(L)ε̂
∗(b)
t (A.1)
6. Now applying the heteroscedasticity based identification method to F̂
∗(b)
t , we obtain the
bootstrap estimates Σ̂
∗(b)
0 , Σ̂
∗(b)
1 , V̂
∗(b)
0 , V̂
∗(b)
1 and R̂
∗(b)
1
30. Note that for the announcement
days we use pol
∗(b)
t instead of polt.
7. We also run a full sample VAR with the resampled F̂
∗(b)
t to get VAR coefficients estimates
F̂ ∗(b)(L). We apply the Kilian’s (1998) bias adjustment procedure for these coefficients. By
using these bootstrap parameter estimates R̂
∗(b)
1 and Φ̂(L)
∗(b) we obtain the bootstrapped
IRF, say IRF
∗(b)
h for the horizon h. Then, we obtain the bootstrap replicate of the observed
variables as ĨRF
∗(b)
h = Λ
′IRF
∗(b)
h for b = 1, 2, · · · , B.
8. Repeating the steps 3-7 B times, finally we have a bootstrap distribution for IRF,
{
ĨRF
∗(b)
h
}B
b=1
.
We can extract the confidence bands for the IRF by finding α/2th and (1− α/2)th quantiles
of the bootstrap distribution.
We apply the bootstrapped Box m test for the factor model. The bootstrapping procedure is
as follows:
30One can skip the estimation of R1 for the bootstrap replication, since the estimation of R1 can cause additional
variance that can widen the confidence interval.
36
1. First we pick the number of the bootstrap replication, B, and the significance level α.
2. We estimate the full sample VAR for the factor model and obtain the reduced form residuals
ε̂t and the OLS coefficients Φ̂(L).
3. For b = 1, 2, .., B, we resample the residuals ε̂t according to standard iid bootstrap method
31.
The resampled residuals are denoted as ε̂
∗(b)
t .
4. This time we do not track the new index of residuals which corresponds to policy days, since
under the null hypothesis residuals for both regimes are generated from same distribution .
5. Then, we reconstruct the observable variables F̂t by using resampled residuals and the VAR
coefficients from full sample VAR:
F̂
∗(b)
t = Φ̂(L)ε̂
∗(b)
t (A.2)
6. Now applying the heteroscedasticity based identification method to F̂
∗(b)
t , we obtain bootstrap
estimates Σ̂
∗(b)
0 and Σ̂
∗(b)
1 . Use same policy day dummy polt.
7. Using these bootstrapped estimates, we construct the test statistic BM∗(b).
8. Repeating the steps 3-7 B times, we have a bootstrap distribution for the test statistic BM ,
say
{
BM∗(b)
}B
b=1
. We can apply standard bootstrap inference.
B Additional tables and figures
Table B.1: ECB Monetary Policy Announcements
Announcement date Announcement description
10-Jan-08 ECB decided to conduct US dollar liquidity providing operations
7-Feb-08 ECB decided to renew two outstanding supplementary longer term refinancing operations
11-Mar-08 ECB decided to conduct US dollar liquidity providing operations
28-Mar-08 ECB decided to conduct supplementary longer term refinancing operations
2-May-08 ECB decided to enhance US dollar liquidity providing operations
30-Jul-08 ECB decided to enhance US dollar liquidity providing operations
31-Jul-08 ECB decided to renew two outstanding supplementary longer term refinancing operations
4-Sep-08 ECB decided to renew three outstanding supplementary longer term refinancing operations
18-Sep-08 ECB decided to enhance US dollar liquidity providing operations
26-Sep-08 ECB decided to enhance US dollar liquidity providing operations
29-Sep-08 ECB decided to double the temporary swap lines
7-Oct-08
ECB decided to enhance longer term refinancing operations and expand US dollar providing liquidity oper-
ations
8-Oct-08 ECB decided to adopt a fixed rate tender with full allotment
13-Oct-08 ECB decided to enhance US dollar liquidity providing operations
15-Oct-08
ECB decided to expand the list of assets eligible as collateral, enhance the provision of longer term refinancing
operations, and provide US dollar liquidity through foreign exchange swaps
31One can use stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994)
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Continuation of Table B.1
Announcement date Announcement description
18-Dec-08
ECB decided that the main refinancing operations will continue to be carried out theroug a fixed rate tender
procedure with full allotment as long as needed
19-Dec-08 ECB decided to continue US dollar liquidity providing operations
3-Feb-09 ECB decided to extend liquidity swap arrangements with the FED
5-Mar-09
ECB decided to continue the fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment for all main refinancing opera-
tions, special term refinancing operations and supplementary and regular longer term refinancing operations
for as long as needed
19-Mar-09 ECB decided to continue US dollar liquidity providing operations
6-Apr-09 ECB decided to establish a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement with the FED
7-May-09
ECB decided to purchase euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the euro area (CBPP1) and to conduct
liquidity providing longer term refinancing operations
4-Jun-09 ECB decided upon technical modalities of CBPP1
25-Jun-09 ECB decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements with the FED
2-Jul-09 ECB started with the purchases of covered bonds (CBPP1)
24-Sep-09 ECB decided to continue US dollar liquidity providing operations
20-Nov-09 ECB amends rating requirements for asset-backed securities in Eurosystem credit operations
3-Dec-09
ECB decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with
full allotment for as long as needed, and to enhance the provision of longer term refinancing operations.
4-Mar-10
ECB decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with
full allotment for as long as needed, and to variable rate tender procedures in the regular 3 month longer
term refinancing operations.
10-May-10
ECB decided to proceed with the SMP, to reactivate the liquidity swap lines with the FED,to adopt a fixed
rate tender procedure with full allotment in the regular 3 month longer term refinancing operations and to
conduct new special longer term refinancing operations
10-Jun-10
European Central Bank has today decided to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment in the
regular three-month longer-term refinancing operations
28-Jul-10 ECB reviews risk control measures in its collateral framework
2-Sep-10
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided to continue to conduct
its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as
necessary and to conduct the 3-month longer-term refinancing operations
2-Dec-10
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided to continue conducting its
main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender and to procedures with full allotment for as long
as necessary and to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations
16-Dec-10
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to establish loan-by-loan infor-
mation requirements for asset-backed securities (ABSs) in the Eurosystem collateral framework
21-Dec-10
ECB decided to continue to conduct US dollar liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of seven
days. These Eurosystem operations will continue to take the form of repurchase operations against eligible
collateral and will be carried out as fixed rate tenders with full allotment
3-Mar-11
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided to continue conducting
its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as
necessary and to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations
9-Jun-11
ECB decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures
with full allotment for as long as necessary and to to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing
operations
29-Jun-11 ECB decided to to extend the liquidity swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve
4-Aug-11
ECB decided to conduct a liquidity-providing supplementary longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO) with
a maturity of approximately six months. The operation will be conducted as a fixed rate tender procedure
with full allotment. ECB also decided to continue conducting its MROs as fixed rate tender procedures with
full allotment for as long as necessary
8-Aug-11 The Governing Council decided to relaunch the SMP for Italy and Spain after a period of inactivity
25-Aug-11 ECB decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangement with the Bank of England
15-Sep-11 ECB decided to conduct US dollar liquidity providing operations
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Continuation of Table B.1
Announcement date Announcement description
6-Oct-11
ECB decided to launch a new covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2) and to decided to conduct
two longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), one with a maturity of approximately 12 months and the
other with a maturity of approximately 13 months. The operations will be conducted as fixed rate tender
procedures with full allotment
3-Nov-11
the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided today upon the technical modalities
of the CBPP2 programme
30-Nov-11
ECB decided in cooperation with other banks the establishment of a temporary network of reciprocal swap
lines
8-Dec-11
The Governing Council announced 2 three-year LTROs5 and decided on additional enhanced credit support
measures to support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market
16-Dec-11
The European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to conduct two one-day liquidity-providing fine-tuning
operations (FTOs).
6-Jun-12
ECB decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures
with full allotment for as long as necessary and to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations
22-Jun-12 ECB takes further measures to increase collateral availability for counter parties
6-Sep-12
ECB started Outright Monetary Transactions Programme and decided on additional measures on collateral
availability
12-Sep-12 ECB extends the swap facility agreement with the Bank of England
6-Dec-12
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided to continue conducting
its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as
necessary and to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations
13-Dec-12 ECB extends the existing swap arrangements with other central banks
21-Feb-13 ECB announced the details on securities holdings acquired under the Securities Markets Programme
22-Mar-13 ECB announces changes to the use as collateral of certain uncovered government-guaranteed bank bonds
2-May-13
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today decided to continue conducting
its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as
necessary and to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations
18-Jul-13 ECB further reviews its risk control framework allowing for a new treatment of asset-backed securities
27-Sep-13 ECB adopts decisions to follow up on the review of its risk control framework
10-Oct-13 ECB and the People’s Bank of China establish a bilateral currency swap agreement
31-Oct-13 ECB establishes standing swap arrangements with other central banks
22-Nov-13 ECB suspends early repayments of the three-year LTROs during the year-end period
24-Jan-14 US dollar liquidity-providing operations as of 1 February 2014
5-Jun-14
The Governing Council of the ECB has today decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations
(MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary. And the Governing
Council has decided to suspend the weekly fine-tuning operation sterilizing the liquidity injected under the
Securities Markets Programme. It also decided to conduct a series of TLTROs and announce for the first
time that the deposit facility rate would be below zero.
17-Jun-14 ECB extends US dollar liquidity-providing operations beyond 31 July 2014
3-Jul-14 ECB announces further details of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations
29-Jul-14 ECB publishes legal act relating to TLTRO (I)
4-Sep-14
The Governing Council set deposit facility rate even more negative (-0.20). The Governing Council of
the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to modify the loan-level reporting requirements for asset-
backed securities (ABSs). Additionally, the Governing Council has decided that, as of 1 October 2014, the
Eurosystem may temporarily accept non-compliant auto loan, leasing, consumer finance and credit card
ABSs as eligible collateral
16-Sep-14 Announcement of the first TLTRO (I)
18-Sep-14 The ECB allots e82.6 billion in first TLTRO
2-Oct-14 ECB announces operational details of asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase programmes
30-Oct-14 ECB appoints executing asset managers for the ABS Purchase Programme
7-Nov-14 ECB suspends early repayments of the three-year LTROs during the year-end period
9-Dec-14 Announcement of the second TLTRO (I)
11-Dec-14 The ECB allots e129.8 billion in second TLTRO (I)
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Continuation of Table B.1
Announcement date Announcement description
22-Jan-15
ECB announced an expanded asset purchase program and announces a modification to the interest rate
applicable to future targeted longer-term refinancing operations
17-Mar-15 Announcement of the third TLTRO (I)
19-Mar-15 The ECB allots e97.8 billion in third TLTRO (I)
16-Jun-15 Announcement of the fourth TLTRO (I)
18-Jun-15 The ECB allots e73.7 billion in fourth TLTRO (I)
22-Sep-15 Announcement of the fifth TLTRO (I)
23-Sep-15 Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS programme
24-Sep-15 The ECB allots e15.5 billion in fifth TLTRO (I)
11-Oct-15 Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges purchasable universe
3-Dec-15 The Governing Council set deposit facility rate even more negative (-0.30)
9-Dec-15 Announcement of the sixth TLTRO (I), The ECB started applying the -0.30 deposit facility rate.
11-Dec-15 The ECB allots e18.3 billion in sixth TLTRO (I)
10-Mar-16
The ECB announced new series of TLTROs (II). The ECB added the CSPP to the APP. The Governing
Council set deposit facility rate even more negative (-0.40)
16-Mar-16 The ECB started applying the -0.40 deposit facility rate.
22-Mar-16 Announcement of the seventh TLTRO (I)
24-Mar-16 The ECB allots e7.3 billion in seventh TLTRO (I)
21-Apr-16 The ECB announced details of the CSPP
3-May-16 ECB publishes legal act relating to the new series of TLTROs (II)
2-Jun-16 ECB announces remaining details of the corporate sector purchase programme
8-Jun-16 The ECB started CSPP
5-Oct-16 Changes to collateral eligibility criteria and risk control measures for unsecured bank bonds
3-Nov-16 ECB reviews its risk control framework for collateral assets
8-Dec-16
ECB adjusts parameters of its asset purchase programme (APP).
Eurosystem introduces cash collateral for PSPP securities lending facilities
15-Dec-16 Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS purchase programme (ABSPP)
Table B.2: Number of
Factors and Rsquare
# Factors Rsquare
1 0.451
2 0.643
3 0.693
4 0.719
5 0.756
6 0.783
7 0.803
8 0.818
9 0.832
10 0.843
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